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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that the
strong policy under the Federal Arbitration Act to enforce
arbitration agreements applies to agreements between workers
and employers. There is an equally well-established policy to
ensure that employees remain free from unlawful discrimination
in the workplace. This article explores those competing policies
and how the federal courts and the Montana Supreme Court
have applied them. Section I provides a brief background and
key provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Act's
preemption of state laws. Section II addresses the Circuit City
cases in depth and the implications of mandatory arbitration in
the workplace.
Section III examines the enforceability of
arbitration agreements under Montana law, and Section IV
discusses other federal principles and their application to the
arbitration of employment disputes. Section V considers the
consequences of implementing arbitration procedures for civil
rights claims in the workplace. This article concludes that
federal court decisions have extended the reach of the FAA to
nearly all employment agreements, but that enforcement of
mandatory arbitration provisions depends on equivalent
protection of an employee's substantive rights in the arbitral
forum.
A host of issues are raised by the adoption of mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the workplace. An
understanding of the issues is important to effectively draft or
review enforceable arbitration policies, or litigate questions
raised by a potentially unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. This article is also useful for non-lawyers who share
concerns about workplace civil rights issues and about the
effectiveness of alternatives to the courtroom as a forum for
resolving workplace disputes, especially those involving alleged
violations of state or federal civil rights laws.
I. FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Background to the FederalArbitrationAct
Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 19251
1.
United States Arbitration Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213 § 1, 43 Stat. 883.
The Supreme Court first upheld its constitutionality as a valid exercise of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263
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to counteract the traditional judicial resistance to arbitration
agreements.
The resistance of the American courts to
arbitration agreements can be traced back to the English
common law. 2 Through the FAA, Congress intended to "place
arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." 3 The FAA established a "federal policy favoring
arbitration."4 In short, Congress mandated that courts enforce
arbitration agreements.
The FAA has been construed as a substantive law which
applies equally to state courts enforcing state statutes. 5 It
applies whether a claim is based on federal or state law. 6 The
Commerce Clause 7 gives Congress the authority to pass the
FAA. The United States Supreme Court has been consistent in
nullifying attempts by state legislatures and state courts to
diminish the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 8
Congress effectively withdrew the power of the states to require
a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which contracting
parties agree to resolve by arbitration. 9
B. FAA Preemption of State Laws: Doctor's Associates, Inc., v.
Casarottolo
There is no express provision in the FAA to pre-empt state

(1932). The FAA was later reenacted in 1947. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947) (current version
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2003)).
2. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,the Court explained that "[t]he need for the law
arises from... the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction ....
This
jealousy survived for so [long] a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the
English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have
felt the precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative
enactment.... " 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
3. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
4. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (citation
omitted).
5. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626
(1985) (holding courts determine whether parties agreed to arbitration under FAA's
"substantive law of arbitrability") (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
6. Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 226.
7. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). The FAA "is based upon and confined to the
incontestable federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 68-96 at 1 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-536 at 3 (1924)).
8. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
9. Id. at 10.
10. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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laws." The intent of Congress was not to occupy the entire field
of arbitration. 12 It was designed to require "courts to enforce
privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other
contracts, in accordance with their terms." 13 The application of
the Act has pre-empted state laws which not only undermine the
goals and policies of the FAA, but also those that treat
arbitration clauses differently from other contractual provisions.
The Doctor'sAssociates, Inc. v. Casarottocase highlights the
power under the FAA to invalidate any state laws which treat
arbitration provisions less favorably than other contractual
provisions. 14
The Montana Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that invalidated any arbitration clause unless the front
page of the contract containing the clause had a notice in
underlined typed letters that the agreement was subject to
arbitration. 5 In upholding the statute, the Montana Supreme
Court reasoned that the notice requirement did not undermine
the goals or policies of the FAA.' 6 The United States Supreme
Court disagreed, finding that the state statute was invalid
because it treated arbitration clauses in contracts more harshly
than other contractual provisions. 17 Under that regimen, state
laws which diminish parties' rights to enforce arbitration
agreements like any other contract, will be void under the FAA.
C. Statutory Text
The key provisions in the FAA are Sections 2, 3, and 4.18
Section 2 provides for the enforceability of arbitration provisions
in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce. " 19
This language is construed broadly to encompass all contracts,
including employment contracts, not expressly exempted by the
FAA. 20 "Commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the FAA. 21 The
11. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 477 (1989).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 478.
14. 571 U.S. 681 (1996).
15. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 274 Mont. 3, 901 P.2d 596 (1995).
16. Casarotta,274 Mont. at 6-8, 901 P.2d at 597-99.
17. Doctor'sAssocs., 517 U.S. at 687-88.
18. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003).
20. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274-82. See also Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113-14 (2001). Although most contracts fall
within the ambit of the FAA, one should still do an initial analysis of whether a specific
contract is covered. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01
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Act's broad reach coincides with the historically expansive scope
of the Commerce Clause. 22
Section 1 also contains the
exemption for "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 23 In Circuit City the Court made clear
that this exemption is narrow and does not exclude contracts of
24
employment as a class.
Section 2 also contains what has perhaps become the most
important provision in the Act with regard to states' rights, as
well as the rights of workers, consumers, small business owners
and other individuals. 25
The provision provides for the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
26
contract."
Under section 3, a party can apply for a stay of court
proceedings 27 pending arbitration under a valid arbitration
agreement. 28 Section 4 provides an avenue for a party to seek a
29
court order compelling arbitration.
Sections 5 through 8 are procedural. Section 5 provides a
default method for appointing an arbitrator if the agreement
does not specify a method. 30 Section 6 states that an application
to a court under the FAA shall be made and heard in the same

(1956), the Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause in an employment contract
was not subject to the FAA because there was no maritime transaction and no
transaction involving interstate commerce. The Supreme Court opinion did not recount
the nature of the work governed by the contract. In City of Cut Bank v. Tom Patrick
Const., 290 Mont. 470, 963 P.2d 1283 (1998), the Montana Supreme Court held that
because the construction contract at issue was purely local and also did not involve
interstate commerce, it was outside the coverage of the FAA.
21. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2003).
22. Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 274.
23. 9 U.S.C. § 1. See also Pike v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 273 Mont. 310, 903 P.2d
1352 (1995) (finding the FAA did not apply to railroad employee's discrimination claim).
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. See discussion infra Part III.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
27. A stay can be brought under the FAA in both state and federal courts. Moses
H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). The FAA does not
itself provide jurisdiction to a federal court.
28. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2003).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2003). Generally, the question of arbitrability-whether the
parties have submitted a particular dispute for arbitration-is an issue for the courts.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 123 S. Ct. 588, 591 (2002). Other
procedural questions, even if they bear on the final disposition, are still decided by the
arbitrator. Id. at 592.
30. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2003).
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manner provided for motions. 31 Section 7 gives arbitrators
subpoena powers. 32 Section 8 applies to specific procedures
regarding admiralty proceedings. 33
Sections 9 through 13
pertain to arbitration awards, including the limited grounds
upon which to vacate or modify arbitrator decisions. 34
II. CIRCUIT CITY, INC. V. ADAMS
A. Employment ContractsNot Exempt from FAA
In Circuit City v. Adams, the Supreme Court definitively
expanded the number of employees who could be subject to
arbitration of disputes arising from their employment. 35 Prior to
Circuit City v Adams, most circuit courts of appeals had
narrowly construed Section 1 of the FAA to exempt only
contracts of employment involving transportation workers, but
not other employment contracts. 3 6 The Circuit City decision was
significant, because it laid to rest any argument that contracts of
employment generally could not be subject to arbitration
agreements. At the same time, the decision highlighted the
tension between state laws enacted to protect fundamental
rights of citizens and the federal power under the FAA to enforce
agreements between employees and employers to arbitrate their
disputes.
The arbitration agreement in Circuit City was contained in
the application for employment. One of the prerequisites to
employment with Circuit City Stores was that employees had to
agree to settle:
[A1ll previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies

31. 9 U.S.C. § 6 (2003). This section was intended to expedite court proceedings
concerning matters pertaining to arbitration. World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 342 F.2d 362, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1965).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2003).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 8 (2003).
34. Section 9 provides a procedure for confirming arbitration awards in court. 9
U.S.C. § 9 (2003). Section 10 sets forth the grounds upon which a United States District
Court may vacate an arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2003). Section 11 sets forth the
limited circumstances in which a district court may modify or correct an arbitration
award. 9 U.S.C. § 11 (2003). Section 12 provides a party with three months to file a
notice of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award. 9 U.S.C. § 12 (2003).
Section 13 sets forth the procedure when an order for entry of judgment is filed with the
court and states that a judgment on an arbitration award "may be enforced as if it had
been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered." 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2003).
35. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
36. Id. at 109, 111 (citations omitted).
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arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for
employment, employment and/or cessation of employment with
Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitrationbefore a
neutral Arbitrator. By way of example only, such claims include
claims under federal, state, and local statutory or common law,
such as Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Americans
with Disabilities
37
Act, the law of contract and the law of tort.

If an employment applicant did not sign the agreement or
withdrew consent to the arbitration provision within three days,
then the applicant was not eligible for employment at Circuit
City. 38
The plaintiff, St. Clair Adams, completed the application
and signed the arbitration agreement. Two years later, Adams
filed a lawsuit in state court against Circuit City and three coworkers alleging sexual harassment, retaliation, constructive
discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under
the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. 39 Adams also
filed a discrimination claim based on sexual orientation under
California statutory law.
Adams sought to recover
compensatory, punitive, and emotional distress damages for the
40
alleged harassment during his employment.
Circuit City responded by filing a petition in federal district
court to stay the state court proceedings and compel arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration agreement Adams had signed. 41 The
42
district court granted the petition to compel arbitration.
Adams appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals
reversed the district court.
It found that the arbitration
agreement was a contract of employment and therefore exempt
from the FAA. 43 The court relied on Craft v. Campbell Soup Co.
which it had decided six months earlier." In Craft v. Campbell
Soup Co., the Ninth Circuit held that the FAA did not apply to
45
employment contracts.
37. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Circuit City I), rev'd, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
38. Id. at 1071.
39. Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2002) (Circuit City II), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1112, 122 S. Ct. 2329 (2002).
40. Id. at 892.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Circuit City I, 194 F.3d at 1071-72.
44. Id. at 1070.
45. Id. at 1071-72 (citing Craft v. Campbell Soup. Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir.
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The United States Supreme Court granted the Circuit City
petition for certiorari on the issue of whether all contracts of
employment are excluded from the FAA. 46 The issue concerned
interpretation of Section 1 of the FAA which provides that the
Act does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce. '4 7 The Ninth Circuit had
concluded that the exemption in Section 1 excluded all
employment contracts from the FAA. 48 The Supreme Court
rejected that statutory interpretation. The Court held that "the
[S]ection 1 exclusion provision [should] be afforded a narrow
construction," 49 and limited the Section 1 exclusion to contracts
50
of employment for transportation workers.
The Court in Circuit City limited the issue and its holding to
the very narrow interpretation of Section 1 of the FAA. It
acknowledged that there were still issues surrounding the
tension between the protection of fundamental rights of
individuals and the broad pre-emptive effect of the FAA. 51 The
Court noted that a large number of amici briefs were filed
including the attorneys general of 21 states with concerns about
52
the FAA's intrusion upon the policies of the separate states.
Arguments had been made that the FAA should not be
interpreted so as to interfere with the states' role in regulating

1999)).
46. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000). The FAA does not
provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. "Section 4 provides for an order
compelling arbitration only when the federal district court would have jurisdiction over a
suit on the underlying dispute.. . ." Circuit City 1, 194 F.3d at 1071. In CircuitCity, the
federal district court originally exercised jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of
citizenship. Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, No. C98-0365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6215, at 6 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
48. Circuit City I, 194 F.3d at 1071-72.
49. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118.
50. Id.
51. An issue arguably left open in Circuit City is whether Title VII prohibits
employers from compelling prospective employees to sign pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. E.E.O.C. v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2002)(Pregerson, H., dissenting). In Luce, the district court had enjoined a law firm from
compelling a job applicant to arbitrate Title VII claims and from enforcing its existing
arbitration agreements against employees. Luce, 122 F. Supp.2d 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
The Court of Appeals vacated the injunction and remanded for entry of judgment in
favor of the employer. Luce, 303 F.3d at 1008. A majority of the Ninth Circuit judges
vacated that panel decision and voted for the en banc court to rehear the matter. Luce,
319 F.3d 1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003).
52. Id. at 121-22.
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employment relationships 53 or with the states' powers "to protect
employees from contracting away their right to pursue state-law
54
discrimination claims in court."
The court declined to directly address these concerns. It
was not inclined to overrule or diminish the sweeping holdings
in Southland 5 or Allied-Bruce,5 6 or limit the broad reach of the
FAA.5 7 The Court went on to justify its position by touting its
view of the advantages of arbitration in the context of
employment litigation.5 8
It reiterated that mandatory
arbitration does not limit substantive rights, but merely changes
59
the forum.
B. Enforceabilityof ArbitrationAgreements Subject to § 2 of
FAA
After the Court determined Section 1 of the FAA applied to
the employment contract at issue, the case was returned to the
Ninth Circuit to decide whether the district court had erred in
compelling Mr. Adams to arbitrate his claims against Circuit
City. 60 On remand, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the employer's
arbitration agreement under the standard found in § 2 of the
FAA, i.e., whether it was unenforceable on "grounds at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." The court of appeals
wasted little time in finding Circuit City's arbitration agreement
not enforceable, because it "functions as a thumb on Circuit
City's side of the scale should an employment dispute ever arise
1
between the company and one of its employees." '
Section 2 of the FAA has become the most important
safeguard under the Federal Arbitration Act for employees who
are subject to mandatory arbitration clauses. It provides that
such agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as
53. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had taken the
position that an employer could not require mandatory arbitration of workplace
discrimination claims as a condition of being hired. U.S. EEOC, Notice No. 915.002,
Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes as a
Condition of Employment (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html.
54. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122.
55. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
56. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
57. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122-23.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 124.
61.
Circuit City 11, 279 F.3d at 892.
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exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 62
This exception offers some opportunity for balancing the tension
between the federal policy in favor of arbitration and the
countervailing law and policy concerned with individual rights.
Under Section 2, state law contract defenses may operate to
63
invalidate an arbitration provision.
In Circuit City, the Ninth Circuit found that the mandatory
arbitration provision was an unconscionable contract of
adhesion.6 It noted that the employer drafted the standardform contract and provided the employee with no opportunity to
negotiate the terms if he wanted to work at Circuit City.65 The
court further discussed the provisions which were substantively
unconscionable because they denied the employee the benefit of
the full range of statutory remedies. The contract was one-sided.
The employee was required to arbitrate all claims against the
employer, but the agreement did not require Circuit City to
arbitrate claims it might have against the employee. The
agreement limited the remedies available to employees who had
valid claims. Employees were required to pay one-half of the
arbitrator's fees. A strict one-year statute of limitations on
employee claims effectively denied workers of the benefit of the
continuing violation doctrine. 6 6 The Ninth Circuit ultimately
reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration on the
grounds that the mandatory arbitration provision was an
unconscionable and unenforceable contract of adhesion under
67
state law.
Despite the strong federal policy endorsing arbitration,
serious concerns remain about the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration in the workplace. The concerns are most apparent
with regard to mandatory arbitration of discrimination and civil
rights claims. The Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City
made clear that challenges to the validity of mandatory
arbitration provisions in employment contracts cannot rely on
the exemption language found in Section 1 of the FAA. Future
challenges must be based on other grounds such as the
substantive requirements of Section 2 of the FAA.
62.
63.
U.S. 681,
64.
65.
66.
67.

9 U.S.C. § 2.
Circuit City H, 279 F.3d at 892 (citing Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517
687 (1996)).
Id. at 894-95.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 893-95.
Id. at 896.
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III. MANDATORY WORKPLACE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS ARE SUBJECT TO MONTANA CONTRACT
LAW
A. Montana ArbitrationPolicy ParallelsFAA Policy
The importance of Section 2 of the FAA and its recognition
of state contract law defenses is apparent when viewing the
interplay between Montana's approach to arbitration and the
effect of the FAA on that approach. Both federal and state laws
apply in determining the enforceability of an arbitration
provision in an employment contract. 68 The FAA preempts state
laws which conflict with the Act. 69 Generally, Montana law is
consistent with the FAA, because Montana has long favored
settlement of disputes by arbitration. 70 The Montana Court has
acknowledged the federal policy favoring arbitration. 71 It has
72
endorsed the notion of equal footing of arbitration provisions."
Even before Circuit City, the Montana Supreme Court upheld
73
arbitration provisions in employment contracts.
In 1985, the Montana Legislature passed the Uniform
Arbitration Act. 74 The purpose of the Act is consistent with the
purpose of the FAA: "[T]o validate arbitration agreements, make
the arbitration process effective, provide necessary safeguards,
and provide efficient procedures when judicial assistance is
necessary." 75 The FAA preempts the Uniform Arbitration Act
only when the application of the state act is inconsistent with

68.

Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 1999 MT 63,

23, 293 Mont. 512, 1 23, 977 P.2d 989,

123.
69. Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp., 1998 MT 326, 23, 292 Mont. 229, 23,
971 P.2d 1240, 23.
70. Walker v. Helena Ass'n of Realtors, Inc., 2000 MT 343, T 9, 303 Mont. 224, 9,
15 P.3d 414, 919; Bennett v. Mahoney, 161 Mont. 510, 515, 507 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1973);
McIntosh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mont. 434, 78 P.2d 82 (1938).
71. Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 261 Mont. 143, 148, 862 P.2d 26, 29
(1993); Vukasin v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 241 Mont. 126, 785 P.2d 713 (1990); Larson v.
Opie, 237 Mont. 108, 771 P.2d 977 (1989).
72. Iwen, T 24.
73. Vukasin, 241 Mont. at 132, 785 P.2d at 718.
74. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 324 (2002). The Act is based on the Uniform
Arbitration Act, UNIF. ARBIITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985), promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1985. The act has
been enacted in 25 other states and the District of Columbia. Id. (Chapter Compiler's
Comments).
75. MONT. CODE ANN. Title 27, Chapter 5 (Chapter Commission Notes,
Commissioner's Prefatory Note).
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the FAA. 76
B. ArbitrationAgreements Must Be Enforceable Contracts under
Montana Law
Although state law cannot restrict the application of
arbitration agreements, state law still governs "issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally." 77 State standards for the enforceability of
a mandatory arbitration agreement must be met. The policy
favoring arbitration agreements extends only to valid
arbitration agreements. 78 The section of the FAA which opens
the door for state law protections of employee rights, as
discussed previously, 79 is Section 2.80
Contract defenses under state law may invalidate
mandatory arbitration agreements. 8 1 Recent decisions of the
Montana Supreme Court indicate that it will seriously consider
defenses objecting to the validity of mandatory arbitration
clauses.8 2 After Casarotto, Montana courts are acutely aware of
treating arbitration agreements the same as other contracts.8 3
The Montana Supreme Court has carefully held the line
between following precedent under the FAA that favors
arbitration and upholding established state policies that protect
fundamental rights of citizens, including their access to the
courts.

76. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 688.
77. Keystone, 23.
78. Mueske v. Piper, Jaffrey & Hopwood, Inc., 260 Mont. 207, 859 P.2d 444, 448
(1993) (affirming denial of motion to compel arbitration where district court found
arbitration agreement invalid because pre-dispute arbitration clause incorporated rules
of New York Stock Exchange but defendant firm then failed to follow those rules in
obtaining agreement with customer). See also Kingston v. Ameritrade, Inc., 2000 MT
269,
15, 302 Mont. 90,
15, 12 P. 3d 929, T 15 (holding that district court erred in
failing to consider and rule upon investor's claim that arbitration clause was invalid
because it incorporated standard industry rules which plaintiff alleged were not followed
by defendant firm).
79. See supra Part II.B.
80. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The party resisting the arbitration bears the burden of proving
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the claims at issue. Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).
81. Doctor's Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686-87.
82. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, 310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1; Iwen,
1999 MT 63, 293 Mont. 512, 977 P.2d 989. See also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc.,
265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 133 (2002).
83. See Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 1998 MT 326, 292 Mont. 229, 971 P.2d
1240.
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General contract principles apply to arbitration provisions.8 4
As with any contract, arbitration agreements are construed
against the drafter.8 5 If an employer requires an arbitration
agreement, it must follow the policies and procedures stated in
the agreement or else the arbitration requirement is in jeopardy
of being declared void. In Chor v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood,
Inc.,86 the brokerage house drafted the arbitration agreement
and provided that it was governed by the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).8 7
One of the
requirements in the NASD rules was that the customer must be
provided with a copy of any arbitration clause and required to
sign an acknowledgment of receipt.8 8 When the broker did not
provide the customer with a copy of the arbitration provision, in
accordance with NASD rules, the Court held that the provision
89
was invalid.
Arbitration agreements, which contain illegal contractual
provisions under Montana law, 90 will be held invalid.
In
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp.,91 the Court held that the
provision in an arbitration agreement requiring the arbitration
to take place outside of Montana was void, because it violated
state contract law. 92 The holding was not inconsistent with the
FAA, because the invalid provision was not particular to
arbitration agreements.
Any choice of forum provisions in
contract agreements that violate Montana law will likely be held
93
unenforceable.
C. Analyzing the Agreement in Terms of Adhesion Contracts
Drafters of arbitration agreements should be particularly

84. Iwen, 26.
85.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-206 (2002), cited in Mueske, 260 Mont. at 216, 859
P.2d at 449-50 (1993); Eschenbacher v. Anderson, 2001 MT 206, 306 Mont. 321, 34 P.3d
87.
86. 261 Mont. 143, 862 P.2d 26 (1993).
87. Id. at 148, 862 P.2d at 29.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court relied on Mueske, in which it had held"... that failure to
comply with controlling law incorporated into an arbitration agreement, such as an
NASD rule, renders a pre-dispute arbitration clause invalid." Id. (citing Mueske, 260
Mont. 207, 859 P.2d 444).
90. Title 28, Chapter 2, part 7 of the Montana Code sets forth illegal contractual
provisions.
91.
1998 MT 326, 292 Mont. 229, 971 P.2d 1240.
92. Keystone, T 22.
93. See id.; Mont. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2002).
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aware of state law regarding the enforceability of adhesion
contracts.
After Circuit City, challenges to arbitration
provisions in employment contracts will likely be brought on the
grounds that the provision constitutes an unlawful contract of
adhesion. 94 The Montana Supreme Court has yet to rule on such
a challenge in an employment contract. 95
However, the
principles that the state supreme court has applied to
96
consumers should also apply to employees.
A contract of adhesion is drafted solely by one party and
provided on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 97 The receiving party has
no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract and has no
realistic options. 98 Whether a contract is a contract of adhesion
can be a factual issue. 99 The nature of the contracting process is
important to determine whether the arbitration provision is a
contract of adhesion. 10 0
If an employer can show that it
negotiated a fair pre-dispute arbitration agreement with an
94. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.
2002); Circuit City 11, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F.
Supp.2d 771, 777-78 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held another
Circuit City pre-dispute arbitration agreement unenforceable because it was permeated
with unconscionable provisions. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1169
(9th Cir., 2003).
95. In Vukasin v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 241 Mont. 126, 785 P.2d 713 (1990), which
dealt with an arbitration provision in an employment contract, the issue of whether the
contract was a contract of adhesion was not discussed.
96. Employees are like consumers in the sense that they lack any real bargaining
power when presented with mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Many
potential conflicts can arise between federal policy favoring arbitration and protection of
substantive consumer rights protected by federal and state law. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d
1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003); But see, Boomer v. A.T.&T. Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir.,
2002) (finding A.T.&T. service agreement was binding contract and that FAA preempted
customers' claim that arbitration clause was unconscionable).
97. Iwen, 28.
98. Id. See KIoss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129,
23-24, 310 Mont.
123,

23-24, 54 P.3d 1, %%23-24 (citing CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, § 1.4 at 13 (1993)).

99. In Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc., the court discussed the lack of a factual
record indicating that the parties had negotiated the contract at issue which contained
the arbitration provision. 265 F.3d 931, 939-40 (2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1133 (2002).
There is an implication that if the record showed that the contract had not been
submitted merely on a "take it or leave it" basis, it would not have been deemed a
contract of adhesion. Id. at 940.
100. Iwen, 1 28. The Ninth Circuit, interpreting California law, has held that the
lack of meaningful negotiations between an employer and an employee who does not
have equal bargaining power renders the contract procedurally unconscionable.
Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 2002). Under
California law, in order to render a contract unenforceable under the doctrine of
unconscionability, it must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Id. at
783. Therefore, finding a contract procedurally unconscionable would be akin to the
initial finding that a contract is a contract of adhesion under the Montana test.
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employee, a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provision might
not be construed as a contract of adhesion. 1 1 The analysis
would then end. The agreement would be enforceable against
the employee and the employer.
As a practical matter, arbitration clauses in employment
contracts are often contracts of adhesion. 10 2 Most employees
Rarely do non-management level
lack bargaining power.
employees negotiate the terms of their employment at arms
length. For the rank and file employee, an arbitration clause
will be contained in a handbook or even a job application
provided to an employee at the outset of the employment.
Failure of the employee to sign on to the handbook or
application, and thereby agree to the terms and conditions
in no
will
result
arbitration,
including
mandatory
employment.103
D. Testing Whether the Agreement Is Enforceable
A contract is not revocable simply because it is a contract of
adhesion. 0 4 A contract of adhesion will be treated differently,
because "traditional assumptions associated with contract law
10 5
are unfounded."
Once it is determined that an agreement is a contract of
101. Cf. Langager v. Crazy Creek Prods., Inc., 1998 MT 44, 287 Mont. 445, 954 P.2d
1169. In Langager,the Montana Supreme Court recognized the importance meaningful
negotiation played regarding the enforcement of policies imposed upon employees. It
held that where the record showed that there had been bargained-for consideration
between the employer and employees regarding new terms in an employment handbook,
the new terms in the handbook were enforceable against the employee. Langager, J 21.
A similar analysis might be applied with respect to contracts.
102. See Kloss, 9 62 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (discussing recent trend of
corporations to implement binding arbitration provisions that people, including
employees are forced to accept).
103. See Id. ("These are the adhesion contracts that ordinary citizens ... must
accept if they want to acquire.., employment. ... "); Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 784
(rejecting argument that employees were not forced to sign agreement, because they
could find work elsewhere). See also Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 771, 778
n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (noting the take-it-or-leave-it choice most prospective employees
face when an employer requires them to sign mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements at the outset of their employment) (citing John A. Gray, Have the Foxes
Become The Guardians of the Chickens? The Post-Gilmer Legal Status of Predispute
Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition Of Employment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 113, 115 (1992)).
104. Koss, $ 24 (citing Passage v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 223 Mont. 60, 66,
727 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (1986)).
105. Id. The Court explained that contracts of adhesion are treated differently
because unlike contracts bargained for at arms length, contracts of adhesion contain
terms 'dictated by one party to another who has no bargaining power and no realistic
options." Id.
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adhesion, the next step in the analysis is to determine: (1) if the
contract provision was not within the reasonable expectations of
the non-drafting party, i.e., the employee; or (2) if it was within
the reasonable expectation of the employee, whether it is unduly
oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy. 10 6 An
arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is unenforceable that
fits into either category.
1. Not Within Expectationsof Parties
A prerequisite to a valid arbitration agreement is that both
parties are aware of the contractual provision. 107 Obtaining an
employee's
signature acknowledging agreement to the
arbitration provision will not by itself insulate the employer
from a challenge that the arbitration clause was not within the
reasonable expectations of the parties. Analysis of whether a
provision in an adhesion contract is within the non-drafter's
reasonable expectations should begin with a review of Koss v.
Edward D. Jones & Co. 108
Alice Koss was a 95-year-old widow who purchased
investment advice and assistance from the defendant
investment brokerage firm. 10 9
During the course of her
relationship with the brokerage firm, Koss signed two
agreements, both of which contained mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses. 110 Kloss agreed to a third contract to open a
charitable trust account. The contract itself was not signed, but
Kloss signed a detachable signature card which acknowledged
that she had received a copy of the contract. The contract
contained a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause."'
Several months later, Koss filed a complaint in state district
court alleging the brokerage firm and securities broker violated
securities laws, engaged in deceptive business practices, were
negligent, breached their fiduciary obligations and committed
fraud.112
The brokerage firm filed a motion to compel arbitration and
stay the district court proceedings. 113 Eventually, the issue of
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Iwen, 27; Koss, 23.
Iwen, 1 27.
2002 MT 129, 310 Mont. 123, 54 P.3d 1.
Id., 9 6.
Id., 91
7.
Id., 9.
Id., 91
12.
Kloss, 2002 MT 129, & 12, 310 Mont. 123, & 12, 54 P.3d 1, & 12.
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whether the mandatory arbitration provisions in the contracts
were enforceable reached the Montana Supreme Court. 114 Moss
argued that the arbitration provision was part of a contract of
adhesion. She argued that by signing the contract she had not
waived her constitutional right to a jury trial. 115 The record
showed the securities broker did not require Koss to read the
agreement, but instead he explained what he believed to be the
significant features of the account. 1 6 He did not consider the
arbitration provision to be a significant provision of the
117
contract.
The brokerage firm argued the clause was enforceable. The
supreme court disagreed. The court noted that the arbitration
provision involved a waiver of at least two constitutional
rights." 8 Finding first the contract was a contract of adhesion,
the court held that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable
because they were not within the reasonable expectations of the
non-drafting party. 1 9 Evidence that Moss signed the contract
was not sufficient to show that the provision was within her

reasonable expectations. 120
The special concurrences in Koss provide additional
guidance as to how the court will analyze whether an arbitration
provision in an adhesion contract meets the first prong of the
enforceability test. The special concurrence by Justice Leaphart
suggests that an employer's practice in obtaining signatures on
an arbitration provision is critical. He notes that an important
factor in deciding Koss was the fact that Moss signed the
signature card not after, but before being provided with a copy of
the arbitration agreement. 12' The special concurrence by Justice
Nelson suggests that the court will strictly scrutinize any
contractual provision which has the effect of waiving a person's

114. Id., 17.
115. Id., 22.
116. Id., T 19.
117. Id.
118. Kloss, 2002 MT 129, 28, 310 Mont. 123, %28, 54 P.3d 1, %28. The supreme
court found that the arbitration provision involved a waiver of the right to access to the
courts pursuant to Article II, section 16 of the Montana Constitution and the right to a
jury trial pursuant to Article II, section 26 of the Montana Constitution. Id. In addition,
the court noted that plaintiff had waived her right to "findings of fact based on the
evidence, and her right to enforce the law applicable to her case by way of appeal ..
Id.
119. Id., %130,32.
120. Id., 29.
121. Id., 46 (Leaphart, J., specially concurring).
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constitutional rights, including arbitration agreements. 122 The
lesson from Koss is that if an employer seeks to implement an
effective pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provision, it must
have a procedure by which it clearly and unequivocally informs
123
the employees of the rights they are waiving.
2. Oppressive or Unconscionable
An unconscionable or unduly oppressive contract is one in
which "the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the
drafter and.., there is no meaningful choice on the part of the
other party regarding acceptance of the provisions.' 1 24 In Iwen,
the court found that the arbitration provision was
unconscionable, because it lacked mutuality. It bound the
consumer to arbitrate any dispute with the company, but not the
company, which could proceed in district court against the
consumer. 25 Further, the agreement limited the remedies a
consumer could obtain, while providing protection to the
company by allowing it attorney fees and costs if the consumer
took legal action. 126 The arbitration provision in Iwen was
clearly one-sided and unreasonably favored the drafter.
In Kloss, the court did not reach the issue of whether the
arbitration provision was unconscionable. The court did suggest
factors to consider in analyzing whether an arbitration
agreement is unconscionable. The analysis in Koss suggests
that the following could be indicators of potential
unconscionability or oppressiveness in arbitration agreements
governing employment claims: (1) the pool of potential
arbitrators contains a disproportionate number of persons who
repeatedly serve as arbitrators for the employer and therefore
may have a bias against rendering a decision that would end

122. Id., 71 (Nelson, J., specially concurring).
123. At first blush, this stricter scrutiny of arbitration provisions might seem to
violate the rule from Casarotto. However, it is consistent with Casarotto and does not
run afoul of the FAA, because the court has and will strictly scrutinize all contractual
provisions which effectuate a waiver of constitutional rights. See Keystone, Inc. v. Triad
Sys. Corp., 1998 MT 326, 26, 292 Mont. 229, 26, 971 P.2d 1240, 26 (holding forum
selection provision invalid does not violate FAA, because the court treats forum selection
provisions in arbitration contracts in the same manner as forum selection provisions in
other contracts).
124. Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 1999 MT 63, 31, 293 Mont. 512, 31, 977 P.2d 989,
131 (quoting Leibrand v. Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. 272 Mont. 1, 12-13, 898
P.2d 1220, 1227 (1995)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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further contractual opportunities with the employer; (2) the
filing fees for an arbitration exceed the filing fees for a complaint
in district court; 12 127 (3) the employee might be responsible for
all or a portion of the arbitrator's fees, and such fees make it
prohibitive for an employee to bring a small claim to arbitration;
(4) the arbitration proceedings are "shrouded in secrecy so as to
conceal illegal, oppressive or wrongful business practices"; (5)
the arbitrator's decision can substantially deviate from the
provisions of applicable law; (6) the arbitrator is not bound by
the facts; (7) employees have limited opportunities to discover
128
the facts necessary to prove their claims.
Equivalency should be foremost in the mind of a person
drafting a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an employment
contract. If employees are denied the substantive rights they
would have by taking a dispute to court, or are reasonably
deterred by the arbitration provisions, the agreement will be
suspect.
3. Contrary to Public Policy
If an arbitration provision in an adhesion contract is within
the reasonable expectations of the non-drafting party and it is
not unduly oppressive or unconscionable, it may still be
unenforceable if it violates public policy. 129 The Montana
Supreme Court has held that a provision in an arbitration
agreement requiring a party to arbitrate a dispute outside of
30
Montana violates public policy.'
The court has defined public policy as follows:
[P]ublic policy can be enunciated by the constitution, the
legislature or the courts at any time and whether there is a prior
expression or not the courts can refuse to enforce any contract
which they deem to be contrary to the best interest of the citizens
In Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., the Ninth Circuit agreed with
127.
the California Supreme Court which held that valid arbitration provisions cannot
require employees to bear expenses which would not be required in a civil action. 298
F.3d 785, 785 (9th Cir. 2002). A provision allowing the arbitrator the discretion to award
the prevailing party fees and costs was insufficient to cure the unconscionability of the
provision. Id. The court reasoned that the up front costs to bring a claim and the threat
that the employee may not be able to recover fees, may deter employees from bringing
valid claims. Id. at 785-86 n.8; see also Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1177.
128. Kloss, 30.
129. Unconscionable adhesion contracts violate public policy. Ticknor v. Choice
Hotels Int'l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating "an unconscionable
arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is unenforceable in Montana as a matter of
public policy."), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1133 (2002).
130. Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 1998 MT 326, 292 Mont. 229, 971 P.2d 1240.
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as a matter of public policy. 131

Other types of contracts such as those containing
exculpatory clauses, 132 requiring subrogation of medical
payment benefits, 133 containing overly restrictive covenants not
to compete, 34 or waiving an employee's right to be paid overtime
compensation 135 are unenforceable because they violate public
policy. Generally, any contractual waiver of the benefit of a law
enacted for a public reason is void. 136 It follows that an
arbitration provision requiring an employee to waive her right to
be free from unlawful discrimination would be unenforceable as
37
a violation of public policy.
IV. OTHER FEDERAL PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE
ARBITRATION OF WORKPLACE CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS
Aside from the general federal policy favoring the
arbitration of disputes and the applicability of state contract law
defenses in executing that policy, additional federal legal
principles apply to the arbitration of employment disputes.
These principles intersect with attempts to enforce or invalidate
an arbitration agreement covering civil rights claims. They
serve to balance the FAA policy promoting arbitration as an
131.
Anaconda Fed. Credit Union # 4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483 P.2d 909,
911 (1971).
132. See, e.g., Miller v. Fallon County, 222 Mont. 214, 721 P.2d 342 (1986).
133. See, e.g., Youngblood v. Am. States Ins. Co., 262 Mont. 391, 866 P.2d 203
(1993).
134. See, e.g., Dobbins, DeGuire T Tucker, P.C. v. Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson,
218 Mont. 392, 708 P.2d 577 (1985).
135. See, e.g., Lewis v. B&B Pawnbrokers, Inc., 1998 MT 302, 25, 292 Mont. 82,
25, 968 P.2d 1145, T125; see also Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945)
(finding a contractual waiver of FLSA rights void as against public policy).
136. Phoenix Physical Therapy v. Unemployment Ins. Div., Contributions Bureau,
284 Mont. 95, 104, 943 P.2d 523, 528 (1997); Amsterdam Lumber, Inc. v. Dyksterhouse,
179 Mont. 133, 140, 586 P.2d 705, 709 (1978).
137.
For example, an arbitration provision which discourages an employee from
filing a complaint of unlawful discrimination with the Montana Human Rights Bureau
(MHRB) might violate public policy. One of the central purposes of the Montana Human
Rights Act (MHRA) is to prevent and eliminate unlawful discrimination, a laudable goal.
See Laudert v. Richland County Sheriffs Dep't, 2000 MT 218, %%56-57, 301 Mont. 114,
IT 56-57, 7 P.3d 386, 91 56-57. The MHRA requires the Department of Labor or the
Human Rights Commission, upon a finding of unlawful discrimination, to enjoin the
discriminating party from further acts of unlawful discrimination. MONT. CODE ANN. §
49-2-506 (2002). It allows the Department or the Commission to impose affirmative
relief to minimize the likelihood of future discrimination. Id. Any agreement that would
prevent an employee from taking steps to allow the state agency to prevent those
unlawful practices or to vindicate the public's interests would be contrary to state public
policy.
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acceptable forum to resolve disputes and the fundamental public
policy protecting individual employee rights, particularly civil
rights established by constitutional or statutory law.
A. No Prospective Waivers of Fundamental Civil Rights:
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Thirty years ago, at the end of the first decade of modern
civil rights legislation, 138 the United States Supreme Court
announced in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co,' 39 that "there
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII."1 4 ° The Court considered such an observation to be "clear,"
perhaps obvious.
It held that a union member was not
precluded from asserting his statutory rights under Title VII
outside the grievance procedures contained in his union's
collective bargaining agreement.
Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a
congressional command that each employee be free from
discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can
form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of
these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose
behind Title VII. "In these circumstances, an employee's rights
"
under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver. 1
138. The following were among the civil rights legislation enacted during this
period: Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964)) (prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1964)) (prohibiting employment discrimination); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 621
(1967)); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 3601 (1968)) (prohibiting housing discrimination); Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1968, Pub. L. 90-321, 88 Stat. 1521 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1968)) (prohibiting
discrimination in credit transactions); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.
L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1972)) (amending Title VII); Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-318, 86 Stat. 374 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1972)) (prohibiting discrimination in education); Rehabilitation Act of
1973 Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973)) (prohibiting
disability discrimination); Montana Human Rights Act, Sec. 1, Ch. 201, L. 1965 (codified
at Mont. Code Ann., tit. 49, ch.2 (1965)).
139. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
140. Id. at 51.
141. Id. at 51-52, followed in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450
U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (holding that individual's rights under the FLSA are not waivable
by collective bargaining agreement and therefore are to be redressed in court). See also
Pike v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 273 Mont. 390, 395-96, 903 P.2d 1352, 1355 (1995); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Barrentine holding might not foreclose individual
agreements to arbitrate FLSA claims. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 506
(4th Cir. 2002) (mandatory arbitration agreement between employer and individual
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Although Gardner-Denver addressed the rights of a union
member to grieve and arbitrate a breach of the labor contract
independently from her right as an individual to be free from
illegal discrimination, the courts have applied the underlying
policy prohibiting prospective waivers of fundamental civil
rights to a variety of contracts unrelated to either union
142
contracts or arbitration agreements.
B. Arbitrationof DiscriminationClaims PermissibleIf
"ChangeIn Forum,Not in Rights": Gilmer v. Interstate
Johnson/Lane Corp.
Seventeen years after Gardner-Denver was decided, the
Supreme Court addressed a variation on the same question in
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson/Lane Corp.143
The Court
considered the enforceability of an agreement with an individual
nonunion employee to arbitrate claims under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. 1'
Relying on a newly
invigorated deference to the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court
denied access to the courts to an investment broker who, as a
condition of his employment with the brokerage company
defendant, had registered with a stock exchange that required
mandatory arbitration of any claims arising from employment in
the securities industry. In its ruling, the Court did not reject the

employee not precluded by FLSA); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456,
1458 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that individual employee who signs enforceable predispute arbitration agreement may be required to arbitrate FLSA claims).
142. See, e.g., EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 745 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Nonassistance covenants which prohibit communication with the EEOC are void as against
public policy"); Davies v. Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1991)
(voiding settlement agreement in a civil action with provision prohibiting plaintiff from
seeking or holding elective office); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 926 (6th Cir.
1983) (finding consent decree unenforceable with respect to waiver of right to file action
regarding possible future acts of discrimination); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085,
1090 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding a provision in separation agreement and release
unenforceable which prohibited filing a charge with EEOC) (quoting Town of Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (finding a "promise is unenforceable if the interest in
its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by
enforcement of the agreement")); Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186 (N.D. 1989)
(employer cannot require as condition of employment contract that employee waive right
to be free from illegal discrimination); Campbell v. Connelie, 542 F. Supp. 275, 279
(N.D.N.Y. 1982) (prospective age discrimination claim not waived by joining retirement
plan regardless of terms of pension agreement). Cf., Pike, 273 Mont. at 401, 903 P.2d at
1359 (following Gardner-Denver in holding that Railway Labor Act did not mandate
arbitration of the claimant's Title VII claims).
143. Glimer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
144. Id. at 23.
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"no prospective waiver" principle enunciated in GardnerDenver,145 but it also did not abandon the presumption in favor
of arbitrating disputes announced in Mitsubishi.146 Instead, the
Gilmer Court underscored the divergence it had seen in
Mitsubishi between waiving statutory rights and waiving the
147
forum. In doing so, the Court found little or no distinction
between the types of statutory rights addressed in Mitsubishi
(anticompetitive claims under the Sherman Act) and the civil
rights protected by the ADEA or other antidiscrimination laws.
Gilmer provides the base line principle regarding the
enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements covering
workplace civil rights claims. The arbitration requirement can
only change the forum and not produce a loss in "substantive"
rights. By agreeing to arbitrate civil rights claims arising out of
employment, an employee "does not forgo the substantive rights
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 148 In Circuit City, the
Court confirmed the Gilmer principle and found it applicable to
149
a civil rights claim under state law.
This "change of forum, not in rights" dichotomy seems
forthright, simple, easy to grasp. In practice, that is a fiction.
1. Unresolved Issues Concerning Change of Forum versus Loss
of Rights
Despite the principle articulated in Gilmer, issues still
remain about whether the procedures in various arbitral forums
yield a net loss of substantive rights. In Gilmer, the plaintiff
145. Most courts have consistently applied Gardner-Denverto preclude compulsory
arbitration of civil rights claims based on a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g.,
Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997); Felt v. Atchison, Topeka &
Sante Fe Ry. Co., 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995). But see Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 980 (1996) (finding no
distinction between arbitration clauses in individual versus collective agreements). The
Supreme Court has confirmed the principal that an arbitration clause in a union
contract does not waive an employee's individual right to litigate a claim under the ADA.
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998). It has left for another day
whether a "clear and unmistakable" waiver of a federal forum for discrimination claims
in a collective bargaining agreement will or will not be enforceable. Id. at 81-82.
146. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631
(1985).
147. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 ("having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should
be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue" (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628)).
148. Id.
149. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123-24 (2001).
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securities dealer challenged the adequacy of arbitration
procedures. 15 0
The Court summarily dismissed Gilmer's
arguments as nothing more than speculation and a reflection of
51
the bias that the FAA was intended to correct.
Other challenges fared no better. Gilmer argued that the
private nature of the arbitration proceeding and lack of written
opinions would impair disclosure of discriminatory practices,
render appellate review ineffective and frustrate the
development of the law. The Court disagreed, finding that
settlements produced those same results. The arbitral body in
question had a sufficient procedure in issuing and making public
summary notices of the awards, and the majority of claimants
would not be compelled to an arbitration forum. The Court
summarily dismissed Gilmer's arguments as nothing more than
speculation and a reflection of the bias that the FAA was
intended to correct.
"[W]e have already rejected most of these arguments as
insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims. Such
generalized attacks on arbitration rest on suspicion of arbitration
as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants," and as such, they are
"far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal
152
statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."

The Gilmer Court's generalized dismissal of concerns about
the efficacy of arbitration in vindicating civil rights violations
occurred under specific facts. The plaintiff was a securities
broker, licensed as a member of an association with a long
history and detailed rules governing the arbitration of
disputes. 5 3 The Court was not addressing how the nearly

150. On the issue of the bias or inadequacy of arbitration panels to further the goals
of the ADEA, the Court recited its perception, until shown otherwise, that the parties
would be willing and able to "retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators."
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 21. It also noted that the arbitration rules at issue provided for
inquiries into arbitrators' backgrounds, preemptory challenges, challenges for cause and
disclosure obligations. Id. at 30-31 (commenting on 2 CCH NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
GUIDE 2608, at 4314 (Rule 608) (1991), available at http://www.nyse.com/.
151. Some commentators have found a contradiction in the Court's acute sensitivity
to the "bias" against arbitration contracts compared to its record of a less sensitive
approach to the "biases" which are the target of various antidiscrimination laws. See,
e.g., Paul L. Edenfield, No More the Independent and Virtuous Judiciary?: Triaging
AntidiscriminationPolicy in a Post-Gilmer World, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1321 (2002); Ronald
Turner, When the Court Makes Law and Policy (with Special Reference to the
Employment ArbitrationIssue), 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 287 (2002).
152. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
153. An important part of the history is the series of sexual harassment lawsuits,
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minimum wage workers in the convenience store, the fast food
restaurant, the local sales counter, the casino or the
maintenance department might fare under employer specific
rules for arbitrating their civil rights claims. The lower courts
have just begun to answer the issues raised in those and other
circumstances. Depending on the court, those answers can
differ as widely as the types of arbitral forums, and on the most
basic matters.
2. Time Limits
One question not presented in the Gilmer case is whether a
mandatory workplace arbitration agreement can shorten the
time limits for bringing a civil rights claim. The answer to that
question can be critical in determining not only whether the
claim is time barred, but also the remedies available.
Under federal laws, there is a wide range of time periods for
filing an employment related civil rights claim depending on the
statutory source. Discrimination claims under Title VII, for
example, are governed by a 180 day statute of limitation that is
extended to 300 days if the claimant files with a state fair
employment practice agency such as the Montana Human
Rights Bureau. 154 Claims for equal pay, age discrimination,
wage and hour violations or denial of family and medical leave
rights adhere to the two year time limit imposed by the Fair
Labor Standards Act, with the statute of limitation also
governing the recovery period for damages. 155 Time limits for
filing claims brought under various Civil Rights Acts of the
nineteenth century 156 follow the most closely analogous state
statute of limitations. 5 7 Under the Montana Human Rights
Act, an employment discrimination claim must be filed within

including class actions, filed against the major brokerage houses in the 1990s. The hard
work of people involved as plaintiffs and their lawyers, or indirectly as advocates and
journalists, as well as industry representatives, legislators and public servants in federal
and state agencies, resulted in wide ranging reforms of arbitration rules and procedures.
A well-researched and thorough discussion of those developments and the lawsuits that
prompted the reforms of the stock exchange arbitration rules is contained in Susan
Antilla, TALES FROM THE BOOM BOOM ROOM (2002).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2003).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2003) (providing a general two year statute of limitations
and, if a willful violation of the FLSA is shown, then a three year period).
156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985 (2003).
157. In Montana, the three-year period for personal injury claims applies. MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 27-2-204(1) (2002); Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's Clinic, 286
Mont. 60, 82-83, 981 P.2d 1, 14 (1997).
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180 days after the alleged discriminatory practice occurred or
was discovered. 15 8 A 180 day time limit also applies to unpaid
159
wage claims made under state law.
As a general rule, the parties to a contract may agree upon
a shorter limitations period for bringing an action than
prescribed by statute, provided the time allowed is a reasonable
60
one and there is no statute that prohibits such action.
Determining the reasonableness of a time limit for filing a claim
under a contract arbitration provision can depend on the
amount of time to file a claim, the type of contract at issue, the
type of claim involved, and other factors. Time limits may be
subject to tolling principles, including those that usually govern
workplace civil rights claims in the courts.' 6 ' The courts have
not agreed on whether, and to what extent, an employer may
shorten the statutory periods for filing claims, but severe
limitations on the time for filing a claim may be unreasonable on
62
their face.
If a state prohibits any contractual provisions which limit
the time period for enforcing rights, state law will apply to void
the limitation. In Montana, such a law provides that "[e]very
stipulation or condition in a contract.. .which limits the time
1 63
within which [any party] may thus enforce his rights is void."
The courts have applied this prohibition outside the arbitration
158. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501(4) (2002). The time limit also applies to claims
made under the Governmental Code of Fair Practices. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-3-315
(2002). The 180 day time limit may be extended a maximum of 120 days if the claimant
pursues an employer established grievance procedure.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2501(4)(b) (2002). If an employment claim arose under the fair housing provisions of the
Human Rights Act, then a two year statute of limitations would apply to filing a civil
action in the appropriate district court. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-510(5)(a) (2002).
159. Wage Protection Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-201 (2002).
160. Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citations omitted). See B. H. Glenn, Annotation, Validity of Contractual Time Period,
Shorter than Statute of Limitations, for Bringing an Action, 6 A.L.R. 3d 1197, 1201
(1966).
161. Zipes v. TWA, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (.
filing a timely charge of
discrimination.., is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.., but a requirement that, like a
statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling"). Time limits
for filing statutory discrimination claims are not tolled by an arbitration proceeding on
the same or related claim. Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 429
U.S. 229 (1976); Capers v. Henderson, 153 F.Supp.2d 846 (E.D. La. 2001).
162. Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 99-56570, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 9157
(May 13, 2003), * 20 (holding time limit provision substantially unconscionable); Soltani,
258 F.3d at 1046 (holding 10 day notice provision invalid); Krahel v. Owens-Brockway
Glass Container, Inc., 971 F.Supp. 440, 452-53 (D. Or. 1997) (finding a three day statute
of limitation imposed by arbitration agreement unenforceable).
163. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2002).
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context, to insurance contracts which attempt to reduce the time
otherwise available to file a claim. 164 As a result, a time limit in
an arbitration agreement in Montana that seeks to reduce a
statute of limitation available to any of the parties will likely be
voidable. However, such a time limit might not invalidate the
entire agreement.
3. Costs of ArbitrationProceedings
The Supreme Court recognized in Green Tree Financial
Corp. - Alabama v. Randolph165 that "the existence of large
arbitration costs could preclude a litigant.., from effectively
1 66
vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum."
The Green Tree decision however did not invalidate the
arbitration agreement because the articulated risk to the
plaintiff was too "speculative."1 67 There was no evidence showing
the costs to be borne by the plaintiff, the organization that
would conduct the arbitration, or even the rules that would
govern. 168 Green Tree placed on the party opposing arbitration
the initial burden of showing that the costs would be prohibitive
and suggested making available limited discovery to meet that
16 9
burden.
Since the decision in Green Tree, a general view has
developed that imposing costs in arbitration similar to amounts
required to file a court case is reasonable, but imposition of
additional costs raises a colorable issue concerning the validity
of the agreement. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of
170
Appeals in Cole v. Burns International Security Services,
explained that view in a decision issued prior to the Green Tree
decision.
We are unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in
which a beneficiary of a federal statute has been required to pay
for the services of the judge assigned to hear her or his case.
Under Gilmer, arbitration is supposed to be a reasonable
substitute for a judicial forum. Therefore, it would undermine
164. J. G. Link & Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 470 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (9th Cir.
1972); Trammel v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Engineman, 126 Mont. 400,
408-410, 253 P.2d 329 (1953) (ElMontana legislature has said that any shortening of the
time [prescribed in the statute of limitations] is unreasonable. 0)

165.
166.

531 U.S. 79 (2000).
Id. at 90.

167.
168.

Id. at 91.
Id.

169.

Id.

170.

105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Congress' intent to prevent employees who are seeking to
vindicate statutory rights from gaining access to a judicial forum
and then require them to pay for the services of an arbitrator
17 1
when they would never be required to pay for a judge in court.

The Ninth Circuit has generally followed that analysis
holding that "a fee allocation scheme which requires the
employee to split the arbitrator's fees... would alone render an
arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable" 172 and that
"the only valid fee provision is one in which an employee is not
required to bear any expense beyond what would be required to
173
bring the action in court."
Agreements which impose costs on workers that are higher
than amounts a claimant must bear in a statutory forum will be
open to challenge. Those challenges will vary. Some may focus
on a failure under the agreement to permit any waiver of fees or
costs, as federal and state laws expressly allow. 74 Challenges
may even arise for the failure to appoint or arrange for legal
counsel for the claimant, also allowed in appropriate
circumstances under some civil rights laws. 175 Many arbitral
forums have rules which allow for the waiver of fees and costs or
reduction of those amounts based on the type of controversy and
the circumstances of the complainant. Whether the courts

171. Id. at 1484.
172. CircuitCity 11, 279 F.3d at 894; Ingle, * 28.
173. Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 786. The court of appeals quoted the holding by the
California Supreme Court in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6
P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000), that an "employer... cannot generally require an employee to bear
any type of expense that the employee would not be required to bear if he or she were
free to bring the action in court." Id. at 687. These decisions have already had practical
consequences.
Effective November 1, 2002, the American Arbitration Association
changed its rules "as a result of recent case law developments. . . to provide additional
safeguards for employees involved in the arbitration process." AAA Announces Changes
Aimed at Fairnessfor Employees in Arbitration,AAA NEWS AND EVENTS, Press Release,
Oct. 29, 2002, available at www.adr.org. "The primary changes require the employer to
deposit the full amount of the anticipated compensation for the arbitrator, unless the
employee chooses to pay a portion, and cap the filing fee for the employee at $125 for
employer-promulgated plans." Id. (quoting American Arbitration Association Senior
Vice President Robert E. Mead).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-505(6) (2002).
175. Title VII provides that "[u]pon application by the complainant and in such
circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such
complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of
fees, costs, or security." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1). See, Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation,
Right of Complainant, Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5() (1), To Appointment of Attorney in
Employment DiscriminationAction, 75 A.L.R. FED. 369 (1985). In Montana, the state
agency does not impose any filing fees to proceed with a human rights claim. MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-504 & 49-2-505 (2002).
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consider these substantive rights, 176 which cannot be diminished
in the arbitration forum, or merely terms and conditions of
employment that can be negotiated by the parties is unclear. 177
4. Discovery Rights
In Gilmer, the Court determined that limiting discovery in
arbitration proceedings did not by itself abridge the employee's
substantive rights under the federal civil rights statute. 178 At
issue were New York Stock Exchange rules for arbitration which
allowed for document requests, depositions, other information
requests and subpoenas. The Court did not address the extent
to which an employer may limit discovery.
It suggested
discovery would be sufficient so long as a party could fairly
present the claims. 7 9 The Court reasoned that limited discovery
is traded "for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration." 8 0 The fact that arbitrators are not bound by the
rules of evidence served, in the Court's view, as a
"counterweight" to reduced discovery.' 8 '
The guiding principle should be that while employees are
not entitled to "unfettered discovery" in arbitration, they are "at
least entitled to discovery sufficient to adequately arbitrate their
statutory claims, including access to essential documents and
witnesses." 18 2 If discovery procedures are part of a pattern of
providing undue advantages to the employer, then those
procedures may not withstand a legal challenge. 8 3

176. See, e.g., Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 604-12 (3d Cir. 2002)
(reversing district court order compelling arbitration and remanding for discovery on the
issue of the estimated costs of arbitration and the plaintiffs ability to pay in order to
determine whether the cost splitting provision of the agreement deterred effective
vindication of the rights at issue).
177. For a further discussion on the cost shifting issue, see, e.g., Clara H. Saafir, To
Fee or Not to Fee: Examining Enforceability of Fee-Splitting Provisions in Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts, 48 LoY. L. REV. 87 (2002); Michael H.
LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Private Justice in the Shadow of Public Courts: The Autonomy of
Workplace ArbitrationSystems, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 (2001).
178. The statute at issue in Gilmer was the Age Discrimination in Employment, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2003).
179. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 787 (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare
Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 684 (Cal. 2000)).
183. See id. (finding the limited discovery was part of an "insidious pattern" of
providing undue advantages to employer in the arbitration agreement).
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5. Remedies
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the available
remedies in employment discrimination cases under various
federal laws, allowing a claimant to seek not only to be "made
whole," but also allowing recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages. 8 4 Claims under the FLSA allow for the recovery of
liquidated damages, i.e., a doubling of back pay awards, in
situations where the employee proves the violation was
willful. 8 5 Time periods for purposes of calculating damage
awards vary. A continuing violation may reach back years. 8 6 A
claim for front pay may extend years into the future. 8 7 The
Montana Human Rights Act neither permits an award of
punitive damages, 8 8 nor limits the amount of damages that may
be awarded to "rectify any harm, pecuniary or otherwise, to the
person discriminated against." 8 9 Monetary relief for civil rights
violations in the workplace varies widely, depending on the
statutory basis and the circumstances.
Separate from any damage claims, civil rights statutes
permit the claimant to obtain various forms of equitable relief if
illegal discrimination or other violation of the law is proven.
Injunctions, restraining orders, requirements to take affirmative
actions to correct the effects of the violation or to prevent future
violations, are all available remedies. In Montana, when an
employee establishes a violation of the Human Rights Act' 90 or
Governmental Code of Fair Practice, 191 the law requires that an
order issue enjoining the employer from engaging in the
92
discriminatory practice in the future.
Arbitration cannot deny a claimant monetary relief that
would have been available in court under the applicable law nor
can it prevent an employee from obtaining appropriate
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2003). The statute places limitations on the amount of
certain types of compensatory damages and on punitive damages. The "caps" are based
on the number of persons employed by the employer. Id.
185. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
186. See Nat'l. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 124-125 (2002).
187. Pollard v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848 (2001) (holding
that front pay award, i.e., damages to be paid for compensation lost during period after
judgment and before reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement, was not subject to
limitations set out in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)).
188.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(2).

189.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1) (b).

190.
191.
192.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-301 to 311.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-3-201 to 209.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1).
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injunctive or affirmative relief upon proof that a violation of the
law occurred. Attempts to eliminate punitive damages, to limit
recoveries to contractual sums, to curtail the period used for
calculating a damage award, and other efforts to dilute the
193
remedial purposes of a statute have been rejected.
Consistent with the federal policies favoring arbitration, the
courts will consider whether an offensive provision can be struck
from the agreement, leaving the remainder in tact and
enforceable. 194 Reformation of the contract by severing the
unlawful term may occur, depending on the degree to which the
overall agreement is tainted by one or more unenforceable
provisions. 95
6. Attorney Fees
A critical component of the federal and state laws allowing
enforcement of civil rights laws has historically been the right of
the prevailing employee to recover his or her attorney fees and
costs after establishing a violation of the law. Employees who
establish prevailing party status are entitled to recover those
amounts as one of the remedies for illegal discrimination. 1 96 In
enacting 42 U.S.C. §1988, Congress acknowledged that private
193. See, e.g., Circuit City II, 279 F.3d at 891; Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001) (severing arbitration provision limiting punitive damages
where parties had included severability clause); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs.,
Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1061, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming refusal to compel and holding
arbitration clause unenforceable where it attempted to limit or curtail statutory
remedies); Underwood v. Chef Franciso/Heinze, 200 F. Supp. 2d 475, 481 (E. D. Pa. 2002)
(holding that arbitration agreement which attempts to impose higher and more difficult
burden of proof on Title VII claimant is unenforceable as attempt to dilute statutory
rights).
194. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
where arbitration agreement includes severability clause, courts should reconcile federal
policy favoring arbitration with important rights created and protected by federal civil
rights legislation by severing from the arbitration agreement those provisions which
impair substantive rights).
195. There is a split among the federal courts about whether severance or avoidance
of the agreement is the proper action in relieving the employee of an unenforceable
provision. Compare Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Services, Inc., 253 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.
2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275 (explaining analysis that must be done to void the
arbitration clause), with Gannon, 262 F.3d at 682-83 (explaining analysis to sever
offending clause, particularly when there is a severability provision), with Hooters of
America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that specific limiting
provisions may be enforceable but if arbitration agreement as a whole shows "systemic
effort to impose ... an inferior forum," then entire agreement is unenforceable).
196. Pollard, 532 U.S. at 847 (plaintiffs who prevail in employment discrimination
cases, "traditionally have been entitled to such remedies as injunctions, reinstatement,
backpay, lost benefits, and attorney's fees under [Title VII]").
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enforcement was critical to vindicating the public policies
embodied in the civil rights laws.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who
must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to
hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil
rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the
to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights
opportunity
197
in court.

Montana has acknowledged this key relationship between
enforcement of an individual's rights and vindication of the
fundamental public policies at the core of its human rights
laws. 198 Holding that claimants in civil rights cases play an
important role as private attorneys general, the state supreme
court has explained that the "purpose of fee shifting provisions
in civil rights laws like the Montana Human Rights Act, is to
encourage 'meritorious civil rights litigation' and ensure
'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with
discrimination grievances." 199
In addressing arbitration agreements which prohibit an
employee from recovering his or her fees and costs after
establishing a violation of federal discrimination laws, a number
of courts have refused to uphold those arbitration clauses. That
type of limitation would defeat the remedial purposes of the
statutes. 20 0 To do otherwise would appear to violate the basic
197.
5910.

S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A. 5908,

198. Laudert v. Richland County Sheriffs Dept., 2001 MT 287,
T 26, 38 P.2d 790, $ 26.
199. Id.
200.

26, 307 Mont. 403,

See, e.g., McCaskill v. SCI Management Corp., 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002)

(arbitration clause prohibited recovery by employee of her fees and costs in any situation
and was therefore unenforceable); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs. 253 F3d 1280 (11th
Cir. 2001) (arbitration clause requiring equal sharing of all costs and fees associated
with proceeding unenforceable since it denied employee access to remedies specifically
available under Title VII); Gambardella v. Pentec, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 237 (D.C. Conn.
2002) (terms of arbitration agreement "cannot be said to provide satisfactory forum for
vindication of [plaintiffs] federal rights" where agreement impairs remedy to recover
fees and costs if she establishes her claim); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp.
2d 582, 616 (D.C. S.C. 1998) (arbitration agreement that denies Title VII plaintiff the
right to recover attorneys fees is void as a matter of public policy); DeGaetano v. Smith,
Barney, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 459, 469 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (awarding attorneys fees following
plaintiffs victory in arbitration of a Title VII claim notwithstanding the provision that
each party shall bear their own costs because "an attorney's fee award [is] one of the
principal remedies afforded by Title VII, and one of the chief statutory mechanisms
designed to effectuate Congress's policy goals of enforcement and deterrence"); Gourley v.
Yellow Transp., LLC, 178 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1204 (D.C. Colo. 2001). See also Graham Oil
Co. v. ARCO Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994) (in a case outside the civil
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Gilmer principle that arbitration effects only a change in the
forum and is not an instrument to undermine federal policies or
to diminish federally recognized rights.
C. Powers of Civil Rights Enforcement Agencies Not Limited by
ArbitrationAgreements: EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.
The federal policy favoring arbitration does not extend
beyond the claims subject to an arbitration agreement or beyond
the parties to the agreement. 20 1 In terms of workplace civil
rights claims, that basic principle-that a contract cannot bind a
nonparty-controls in preventing mandatory arbitration
agreements from impeding the statutory role played by the
EEOC and other agencies in enforcing policies prohibiting illegal
discrimination. In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that mandatory arbitration
agreements imposed limitations on the remedies that could
"[T]he
otherwise be sought by enforcement agencies. 20 2
proarbitration policy goals of the FAA do not require the agency
to relinquish its statutory authority" to pursue any relief
authorized by the applicable law, regardless of the forum that
the employer and employee have chosen to resolve their
203
disputes.
In Waffle House, the lower court ruled that the EEOC was
prohibited from pursuing any "victim-specific relief' in a
disability discrimination case due to an enforceable arbitration
20 4
agreement between the charging employee and his employer.
The EEOC could pursue injunctive remedies to vindicate the
public interest, but not back pay, punitive damages or other
20 6
monetary relief.20 5 The Supreme Court disagreed.
The Supreme Court held that the ADA, as well as Title VII,
"unambiguously" conferred authority upon the EEOC to obtain,
rights area, holding that claimant's rights to recover fees was important to effectuate
federal policies underlying the statute and arbitration agreement prohibiting such
recoveries contravened statute, could not be severed, and rendered agreement
unenforceable).
201. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26 (stating "the first task of a court asked to
compel arbitration. . . is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that
dispute"). The FAA is "at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private
contractual arrangements." Id.
202. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
203. Id. at 294.
204. Id. at 284.
205. Id. at 285.
Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 285 (2002).
206,
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by agency action in the courts, any of the various types of relief
permitted under the statutes. 2 7 Congress had placed no
language in those civil rights laws to suggest that an arbitration
agreement between private parties materially changed the
EEOC's statutory functions or powers. 20 8 At the same time, the
FAA does not address enforcement by public agencies. 20 9 The
EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement. 210 In the
event the EEOC successfully obtained victim-specific remedies
in its action, the courts had available methods to prevent any
2 11
double recovery for the individual whose rights were violated.
Limiting the remedies available to the EEOC would diminish
the agency's duties without any statutory authority, Justice
Stevens explained, and would turn "what is effectively a forum
selection clause into a waiver of a nonparty's statutory
212
remedies."
The impact of the Waffle House decision on the utility of
mandatory workplace arbitration agreements is unclear. The
majority of the Court looked at the EEOC's historic practice of
filing suit in only a fraction of the charges (1/2 of 1%) that
employees file, noting that in the year 2000, a total of 79,896
charges were filed. The agency made reasonable cause findings
in 8,248 of those proceedings, but filed suit or intervened in only
402 cases. 213 In that context, the Court determined there would
be "a negligible effect on the federal policy favoring
214
arbitration."
The dissent saw a much darker picture, claiming that the
decision "eviscerates" the private arbitration agreement,
reducing it to "all but a nullity."215 As Justice Thomas viewed
the Waffle House decision, it places employers requiring those
agreements "at a serious disadvantage" and "discourages the use
of arbitration agreements" generally. 2 16 Neither forecast seems
precise.
The Court failed to consider the practical effect of its ruling

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id.
Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).
Id. at 295.
Id. at 290 n.7,
Id.
Id. at 309 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 310 (2002).
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on employers. 2 17 An arbitration agreement cannot limit an
employee's right to file a charge of discrimination. 218 The EEOC
refers nearly all discrimination charges to authorized state
enforcement agencies for investigation and processing. 2 19 In
Montana, claims filed with the EEOC are referred to the state
Human Rights Bureau, or alternatively, claims filed with the
Human Rights Bureau are dual filed automatically with the
federal agency whenever the case meets the jurisdictional
minimum. 220 In conducting the investigation, the Human Rights
Bureau or other FEP agencies have authority to compel the
production of information if a party does not voluntary
cooperate. 22 1 The state agencies also may have separate
authority, under state law, to initiate actions on behalf of the
222
employee if sufficient evidence of an illegal practice is found.
From the time an employee files a charge with the state until
the matter is concluded, the possibility of a civil action by the
state agency remains open.
Under Waffle House, the employer must defend against an
administrative charge of discrimination regardless of any
arbitration agreement with the charging party.223 An answer
217. The pessimistic view of the pro-FAA dissent in Waffle House falters to a
greater degree than the majority downplays the potential deterrence to workplace
arbitration agreements. The comment that the decision "sets this Court on a path that
has no logical or principled stopping point" and will undermine not only arbitration but
settlement agreements in discrimination cases is at best hyperbole. Waffle House, 534
U.S. at 311-312. By 1997, years before Circuit City resolved that workers were not
generally exempt from FAA coverage, the American Arbitration Association already
estimated that "more than 3.5 million employees [were] covered" by agreements
designating the AAA to administer the arbitration proceedings. Id. at 296 n.11. That
trend has not diminished.
In 2000, "more than 500 employers and five million
employees" were relying upon the AAA's employment arbitration programs. See
American Arbitration Association, 2000 Annual Report 28 (2001), available at
http://www.adr.org/upload/LIVESITE/Aboutlannualreports/ annual report 2000.pdf.
218. See Waffle House, 534 U.S: at 280-83.
219. 42 USC § 2000e-8(b). The state enforcement agencies are known as "fair
employment practice agencies" or "FEP agencies."
220. An extended discussion of the allocation of responsibilities for processing
employment discrimination claims under the E.E.O.C. worksharing agreements with
qualified state agencies is found in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products, Inc., 486 U.S.
107, 109-118 (1988). See also Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
106 (1991) (explaining that claimant required by law to file discrimination charge with
state agency under worksharing agreement is not precluded by an adverse agency
decision from bringing later federal court action); Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc.,
186 F.3d 1172, 1175-1177 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining procedures under the E.E.O.C.
worksharing agreements with state agencies and effect of"dual filed" complaints).
221. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-203(2002).
222. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-210 (2002).
223. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 280-83.
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must be filed, discovery must be answered and witnesses or
other employees must be made available to answer questions.
An employer cannot use an arbitration agreement to prevent
governmental review and processing of a civil rights charge, nor
can it prevent a public report on a violation if found. 224 On the
other side of the ledger, the Waffle House decision provides at
least some protection of the interests of employees and the
public at large in preventing or eliminating illegal employment
discrimination.
The guiding principle established by Waffle House is not
about how many lawsuits the EEOC will bring in the future or
how many employers will be more reluctant to adopt mandatory
arbitration clauses as a requirement for joining their workforce.
Neither of those numbers may increase noticeably. Instead, the
decision stands as a forceful reminder. An arbitration provision
may not serve as a barrier to employees reporting or filing
claims with the governmental agencies charged with the duty of
processing and investigating claims of illegal discrimination and
with vindicating the public interests if violations are found.
V. CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
FOR ARBITRATING CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS IN THE
WORKPLACE
Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution which
has been heralded by some as a way to save time, money and
energies in resolving disputes. 225 Others are muted in their
praise, believing an arbitral forum is one alternative to
traditional legal proceedings that deserves consideration. For
arbitration to be effective as an alternate forum to workplace
disputes, all parties must realize benefits. There must be gains
for the employer and the employee in using this method of
alternative dispute resolution. This section is intended to raise
issues for consideration in deciding whether a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement is appropriate and in drafting or entering
into such an agreement.
As a general matter, if an employer uses a mandatory predispute arbitration procedure to attempt to deter the filing of
224. See MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.212 (2002) which advises that information obtained
in the investigation of a human rights complaint will be public information unless
restricted from disclosure by constitutionally protected privacy interests.
225. See Sarah Johnston, ADR In The Employment DiscriminationContext: Friend
or Foe To Claimants, 22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 335, 335-37 (2001) (noting how
ADR has been taught in law schools).
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meritorious claims, limit available remedies, or otherwise tip the
scale unreasonably in their favor, they might find themselves in
226
If
a more complicated and expensive set of proceedings.
employees enter into mandatory arbitration agreements without
reading what rights are at stake and without being informed,
227
then they too may find themselves at a similar disadvantage.
Arbitration can be an efficient and effective method of
resolving workplace disputes for employers, employees 228 , and
the public at large. 229 The decision whether to enter into a
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement should not be
taken lightly. Thoughtful consideration should be given to a
process that requires arbitrating a dispute and what rights may
or may not be relinquished.
Limiting costs 230 in resolving a workplace dispute should
226. See supra parts III and IV. Drafting a provision that sets the correct tone and
context for a mandatory arbitration agreement should help in enforcing the agreement if
challenged. The following is an example of the type of "purpose" clause that may be
useful.
The intent of this agreement is to provide a change in forum and not a change in
substantive rights under federal or state statutory protections. If any provision in this
agreement is construed by a court (of competent jurisdiction) as unenforceable or as
having a discriminatory intent or effect, that provision is deemed severable and void for
the purposes of this agreement and shall have no effect on the other provisions of this
agreement.
227. The possibility of a job, especially in hard times, may cloud an applicant's view
at the start of the employment process and be far costlier than expected in the long run.
The best advice is to know what one is signing before signing. Knowledge of the
contractual provisions is important for workers, customers, borrowers and consumers
alike. Asking questions, finding information and making an informed decision need not
be avoided.
228. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee
Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1998) (opining that mandatory arbitration may be beneficial for employees).
229. Scott Atlas, Have You Ever Tried to Make Up Your MindC About Arbitration?
A.B.A. J. SEC. LIT., Vol. 29 No. 1, Fall 2002, at 1 ("As litigation has become increasingly
complex, potential damage awards have increased, and legal representation has become
coslier, arbitration seemed like a panacea."). However, the American Bar Association
Section of Litigation has recognized that little has been done in the way of empirical
study to compare the relative merits of arbitration over traditional litigation. To answer
outstanding issues concerning such a comparison, the Section has developed a task force
to research and report on the arbitration process. They intend to collect data on the
perceptions and experiences of attorneys and litigants regarding concerns about
arbitration such as cost, fairness, timeliness, predictability of result, and other
considerations. Id. at 69; Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage
From Using Mandatory Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399,
401 (2000) (providing comprehensive discussion of the disadvantages of mandatory
arbitration for employers).
230. A non-profit organization called Public Citizen states that there is no research
to substantiate the perception that arbitration saves costs. This group disputes that
costs are saved. Public Citizen, Cost of Arbitration: Executive Summary (May 1, 2002),
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benefit both parties. A speedier resolution of a legal controversy
between employers and employees is a savings, not only in
expenses but also in the personal and emotional costs that often
accompany litigation. Economies are possible in eliminating
excessive motion practice which can occur in the courts. As a
general rule, less discovery occurs in an arbitration
proceeding. 231 On this point alone, considered by many to be the
costliest part of a lawsuit, there may be direct and indirect
savings in the fewer dollars spent on discovery and in the fewer
hours of work and personal time lost in prosecuting or defending
the matter. The limited avenues for appeal and greater finality
should also conserve costs. Finally, in some circumstances,
parties can proceed to arbitration without the need for outside
attorney representation. That will depend on the issues raised
and often on the type of dispute. It may offer, in some cases, a
232
substantial cost savings.
While the courts are not in complete agreement about how
to pay the costs of the arbitration 233, employers need to be aware
that if the costs associated with the arbitration effectively
impair an employee's right to bring a meritorious claim, a court
battle may ensue and the employer might end up paying the
arbitrator's fees and costs, in addition to absorbing the expenses
of that collateral litigation. To avoid this potential problem a
pre-dispute arbitration provision should limit the costs imposed
upon an employee to an amount no greater than what they pay
in filing an action in district court.
An arbitral forum may offer greater access than a court to
employees who have claims arising from the terms and

available at www.lawmemo.com/arb/res/cost.htm; cited in Atlas, supra note 229, at 2;
Green, supra note 230, at 212.
231. See supra part IV.B.4. Reasonable limitations on discovery are probably
allowable.
However, if the discovery rules unreasonably favor the employer, the
provision is subject to challenge. Limited discovery and the greater ability of employers
to control that process might be one of the greatest hindrances to claimants.
232. There is a countervailing argument to proceeding without outside legal
counsel, particularly in civil rights cases. The disadvantage will often work against the
employee who has no ready access to attorneys, while employers in most instances will
at least have access. For either side, the absence of experienced counsel in the area can
lead to unintended consequences that are far costlier-in terms of lost value of a claim or
in terms of greater liabilities-than the short term thriftiness of representing yourself in
any legal proceeding, including arbitration.
233. See generally Saafir, supra note 178, at 98; David R. Wade & Curtiss K.
Behrens, Opening Pandora's Box: Circuit City v. Adams and the Enforceability of
Compulsory, ProspectiveArbitrationAgreements, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (2002).
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conditions of their work. 234 If the arbitration provision covers
submission of all workplace claims, the employee can benefit by
having all claims in a single forum. Employers may not realize
the same advantage. The alternate remedies available under
state and federal antidiscrimination laws illustrate the
differences. In a claim under the Montana Human Rights Act,
punitive damages are not available and affirmative relief can be
subject to statutory limits. 235 At the federal level, punitive
damage awards are expressly permitted under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, and the court's full equitable powers are available
as a remedy against future violations. 236 An employee must file
a federal claim separate from any state human rights proceeding
to seek full relief, an occurrence which may happen, if at all,
after a full hearing or trial under state law. If arbitration offers
a single opportunity to have all claims heard, the employer may
face both compensatory and punitive damages, as well as the
23 7
full range of equitable remedies, in the same action.
Employees may benefit from the relative simplicity in using
arbitration procedures. That simplicity, however, may result in
arbitration of disputes that would better be handled as ordinary
grievances and would not likely be filed in court. 238 To avoid
arbitration of those workplace disputes, an employer might
consider a threshold claim value before either party may invoke
arbitration. 2 39 For employees with discrimination claims, that
prerequisite should have little impact on an ability to seek relief
for the violation of a fundamental right, even where the dollar
value of the loss is difficult or impossible to measure. The right
to file a charge with a state or federal administrative agency
remains unaffected, regardless of the value of the claim or the
existence of any mandatory arbitration agreement in the
234.

See Johnston, supra note 225, at 373-74.

235.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506 (2002).

236. 42 U.S.C. § 1981aa(1) (1994).
237. At the same time, employees are not foreclosed from filing a claim with the
Montana Human Rights Bureau, seeking injunctive and affirmative relief in that forum.
See supra Part V.C.
238.
The principles underlying awards of attorney fees and costs to prevailing
parties in civil rights cases are intended to help limit frivolous or groundless claims. See
supra Section IV.B.6. Under those principles, a claimant can be assessed the fees and
costs incurred by the defense if the claim was "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless"
and the claimant "continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978), 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); McCann v. Trustees, Dodson
School Dist., 249 Mont. 362, 364, 816 P.2d 435, 437 (1991).
239. For example, an employer could provide that arbitration is not available for
claims involving damages of less than $5,000.
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workplace. 240
For employers who may be concerned about excessive costs
of claims with no merit, providing pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration might not be the best solution. Some perceive that
arbitrators are reluctant to grant summary judgments, while
the courts have increasingly used that avenue to resolve claims
that cannot meet basic proof elements, or to resolve issues in
favor of the plaintiffs that cannot reasonably be disputed. There
is a perception that some arbitrators, regardless of the merits of
the claim, tend to "split-the-baby."241 These concerns might be
eliminated by
allowing either party to "opt-out" of the
arbitration proceeding after a dispute arises. They also may be
eliminated by incorporating within the arbitration agreement
established rules that closely follow many civil procedures,
including summary disposition and reference to basic
evidentiary and legal standards.
Requiring an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators to be
qualified in the field, with a demonstrated expertise in
employment or civil rights law, is also an option. Each of these
refinements to a generalized, unspecific arbitration agreement
may bolster the equivalency of the forum in terms of substantive
rights, while addressing the needs of a particular work force.
There is one caution. The more creative arbitration agreements,
like the more aggressive ones, are at greater risk of prompting
litigation over the arbitration agreement itself.
Some commentators believe that large employers 242 benefit
by being "repeat players" in arbitration proceedings. Although
balanced in the labor-management area by the countervailing
weight of union organizations, no individual employee can
expect to draw on the assistance of the same arbitrator or even
the same arbitral entity time and again. Employing the same
arbitrators over several years can become problematic' because
the employer often develops a "business" relationship rather
than an adjudicatory one with the arbitrator, creating an
appearance of a conflict of interest on the part of the arbitrator
that suggests bias.
From both the employer's and the
employee's perspective, impartiality is critical. Choosing a
qualified and credible 243 arbitrator who is familiar with a
240. See supra part I.C.
241. See Atlas, supra note 229, at 69.
242. Smaller employers would tend not to be repeat players.
243. It is important that both the employee and the employer have faith in the
arbitrator. If both parties feel that the arbitration proceeding provides them with their
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particular area of law is important for an effective arbitration. 244
Rules incorporated into any arbitration agreement should
require that any selected arbitrator abide by the Arbitrators'
245
Code of Ethics.
There are a variety of model arbitration procedures. Some
are better than others. 246 If an employer adopts a particular
model and requires compliance with a specific set of rules-such
as the Uniform Arbitration Act or the rules of the American
Arbitration Association, New York Stock Exchange, National
Association of Securities Dealers, National Arbitration Forum or
some other institution-the employer should be familiar with
those rules.
Employers should provide all employees and
employment applicants with the rules, and an adequate
opportunity to review them, before the request to sign an
agreement. While an employer and employee might want to
agree to some provisions in the model rules, others might not
accomplish the mutual goals of an effective arbitration
proceeding. Adaptation of rules incorporated into an arbitration
agreement may be more appropriate in a post-dispute setting,
when the particulars of the claim are known.
In addition to the relative interests of the employer and the
employee, the public interests should weigh into the
considerations regarding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
fair "day in court," challenges to the proceeding might well be eliminated. Further, if the
resolution involves an ongoing working relationship, it is important that both parties
embrace the reasoned solution of the arbitrator. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics
Issues In Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution Processes: What's Happening and
What's Not, 56 U. MiAMI L. REV. 949, 950-951 (discussing ethical issues in arbitration: It
is "essential that some forms of transparency, disclosure, rules, sanctions, and
consequences will be necessary for arbitration to maintain any semblance of legal
legitimacy and justice").
244. In Gilmer, the Court stated that a provision whereby parties are informed of
the employment histories of the arbitrators and that they be permitted to make further
inquiries into the arbitrator's backgrounds will help avoid biased arbitrators. A
procedure allowing peremptory challenges and unlimited challenges for cause will help
avoid a biased arbitrator. The Court in Gilmer noted that the FAA protects against bias
by permitting a court to overturn arbitration awards "[wihere there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting 9 U.S.C. §
10(b)).
245. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 243.
246. The Montana Supreme Court has suggested that the SEC-approved model
arbitration procedures (NYSE and NASD rules) "are not unconscionable as a matter of
law." Chor, 261 Mont. at 149-50, 862 P.2d at 30. See also Mueske, 260 Mont. 207, 859
P.2d 444 (1993), for a relatively detailed discussion of the Securities Industry Conference
on Arbitration and the ensuing industry rules intended "to maintain fair and efficient
forums for the arbitration of disputes between members and investors." Id. at 214-215,
859 P.2d at 449.
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proceedings. Clearly, the courts have decided that the FAA
reflects a congressional expression that arbitration of disputes
serves the public interest.
States that have adopted the
Uniform Arbitration Act have also determined that a fair
arbitration forum is in the public interest. Tensions arise
because the public also has a separate, overriding interest in
preventing or eliminating illegal and discriminatory practices.
Public concerns exist about a net loss to the public if civil
rights disputes are handled in the privacy of arbitration, away
from an open and accessible forum. 247 There is a concern as well
for the loss in published precedent that may result from a
substantial increase in arbitration of these claims. The lack of
publicity associated with most arbitration proceedings may
impair the development of discrimination jurisprudence through
precedent and deny valuable guidance about rights and
responsibilities under these laws. 248 Perhaps most important,
there is a concern that the trend to arbitration is an effort to
privatize civil rights enforcement.
Following that view,
arbitration places most civil rights issues in the workplace
outside the realm of public policy and into a category of routine
business transactions, handled by all parties with attention only
to their self-interests and costs, rather than a commitment to
underlying values and goals in a democratic society. 249 The
eventual impact of arbitration on effective civil rights
enforcement remains unknown.
Too many issues remain
unanswered; too few standards have been established in the
law.
Many of the questions and concerns raised about mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, and the risks of litigation
over those agreements, can be avoided by agreeing to arbitrate
after a dispute arises. Offering post-dispute arbitration can
permit the employer and the employee to gain the benefits of
arbitration and avoid the detriments inherent in a mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration procedure.
Employers should offer
247. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 225, at 379.
248. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes as a Condition of Employment, supra note 53 (describing how
"the public nature of the judicial process enable[s] the public, higher courts, and congress
to ensure that the discrimination laws are properly interpreted and applied"); see also
Antilla, supra note 153.
249. See generally Kloss, 2002 MT 129,
61, n.3, 62, 293 Mont. 512, IT 61, n.3, 62,
977 P.2d 989
61, n.3, 62 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (citing law review articles
discussing "corporate abuse of ordinary citizens and small business people by way of the
inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses in contracts of adhesion").
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meaningful and mandatory internal grievance procedures.
Employees are well advised to implement them. If the dispute is
not resolved, both parties can then consider whether arbitration
offers a suitable method of resolving the controversy rather than
forcing either party into mandatory arbitration. The employer
might have an arbitration procedure already outlined, but
should be open to the possibility of negotiating terms with the
employee to reach an agreement. Using that option, both
parties can agree to procedures which will allow them to resolve
their dispute in an efficient and cost effective manner, and one
that will not be subject to challenge.
VI. CONCLUSION
The momentum of the federal law in enforcing the FAA
policy requiring the courts to assure equal treatment of
arbitration agreements as enforceable contracts has now moved
to encompass all employment agreements-not just with the
highly compensated executive, the highly skilled professional or
the union member. The service sector employee, the clerk or
receptionist, the counter salesperson, the day laborer and all
other workers, save those in the transportation industry, may be
required to submit any claims arising from their employment,
even federal and state civil rights claims, to an arbitral forum.
Today and tomorrow, the focus in mandatory workplace
arbitration will be on drafting (and litigating) a new generation
of employment agreements to determine if a pre-dispute
mandatory arbitration provision is enforceable. It is unlikely
that most of the issues of enforceability will be answered quickly
or within even the next 10 to 20 years, given the variety of
employers, employees, arbitration clauses, arbitral forums and
the differing views of the courts. For the practicing Montana
attorney, or their employer or employee client, at least one
guiding principle should help avoid the risk of bearing the
expenses involved in litigating unanswered questions in this
area. In terms of statutory employment rights, especially claims
alleging fundamental
civil rights violations, providing
equivalent protections in arbitration-the change in forum only
and not in rights-will substantially decrease the likelihood of
an unenforceable agreement.
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